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Abstract 
China’s engagement in Africa is an increasing popular topic in 21st century. 
However there are not much attention have been paid in the field of education and 
little evidence can be seen about what actually happens on the ground. This paper 
aims to explore China’s educational aid in Africa, from both textual and fieldwork 
resources. It will focus on three parts: firstly, the existing recognitions on China’s 
distinctions in foreign aid and China’s donor logic based on ‘win-win’ strategies; 
secondly, an argument that China's donor logic in educational aid might be 
informed by producing soft power through the ‘public diplomacy’; thirdly, a 
discussion of people’s perception collected in Tanzania, including voices from 
official people and returning African students. The paper will take China’s main 
educational approach, the Government Scholarship Scheme as an example, and 
look at how this educational practice has been processed in a ‘diplomatic’ way. It is 
concluded that China’s educational aid and its features in practice, based upon 
diplomatic policies and China’s distinctive donor logic of foreign aid, is serving 
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bilateral relations rather than orthodox aid relations. If quality transformation and 
communication can be maintained in the Chinese universities, education would 
contribute to a lasting and cooperative relationship between China and Africa. It 
may add more complexities to ‘soft power’ within broader conceptions under the 
contemporary global political economy. 
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1. Chinese aid to Africa: a different logic? 
Aid has been operated within a changing global situation from the period of 
‘decolonisation’1 to the current period of ‘globalisation’, and from the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ based on neoliberal policies to ‘Post Washington Consensus’ based on 
poverty reduction agenda (Robertson et al., 2007; Yuan, 2012: 258).2 It varies from 
country to country and from actor to actor, and its forms have also changed 
significantly during the last fifty years. From George C. Marshall’s plan to provide 
massive aid to European countries in order to rebuild their economies after the 
Second World War, to the US oriented aid policy for strengthening national 
security, and the other Western countries’ considerations based more upon moral 
principles and ‘a kind of veneration of their own former colonies’, the motives of 
                                                          
1 The 1960s were labelled the ‘development decade’ by the United Nations, and such a label 
corresponded with the ‘departing of colonialism’ (United Nations, 1961: 17). The concept 
‘decolonisation’ refers to the achievement of independence by former Western colonies in Africa and 
protectorates in Asia following the Second World War (United Nations, 1961; Laenui, 1999). 
2 Robertson, S., Novelli, M., Dale, R., Tikly, L., Dachi, H. & Alphonce, N. (2007) Globalisation, 
education and development: Ideas, actors and dynamics. (London, DFID Publications). 
Yuan, T. (2012) Does Western ‘aid’ work? - Changing discourses and logics, Academics in China 
(English Version), (2), 257-275. 
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donors are changing (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 9).3 Aid 
is not a neutral term; it carries clear strategies and motives, and contains complex 
relations.  
Although it has taken various forms, the underlying ‘principles’ of aid, based on 
modernisation theory, are quite consistent in the Western context, and assume that 
developing countries need ‘help’ in order to ‘catch up’ with developed countries, 
including the area of education. In American economist W.W. Rostow’s (1960) The 
stage of economic growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, modernisation theory 
became the “dominant explanation of how low-income countries could improve the 
living conditions of their populations by following a set of prescriptive policies to 
encourage economic ‘taking off’” (Robertson et al., 2007: 19).4 This has set the 
fundamental rationale of Western aid.  
With the increasing South-South cooperation and the fast economic development in 
some developing countries, it has been increasingly recognised that the ‘emerging 
donors’, also called non- Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors 
(Davies, 2007; Woods, 2008; King, 2010a) are challenging this orthodox ‘logic’ of 
aid.5 In a recent discussion of ‘challenging the aid paradigm’, Sörensen (2010: 3) 
points out the challenge to Western aid clearly: 
                                                          
3 Degnbol-Martinussen, J. & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2003) Aid: Understanding international 
development cooperation. (London, Zed). 
4 Rostow, W. W. (1960) The stages of economic growth. A non-communist manifesto, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press). This is cited in Robertson et al. ‘Globalisation, education and 
development: Ideas, actors and dynamics’.. 
5 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) deals with issues related to co-
operation with developing countries. The Western donors to African countries mentioned in this paper 
refer mostly to DAC countries such as Germany, France, Japan, UK, US, Switzerland, etc. These 
compare with the new donors to Africa such as China. 
Davies, P. (2007) China and the end of poverty in Africa – towards mutual benefit? (Sundbyberg, 
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However, although there is with some variation, a general Western 
consensus, which is also the international mainstream operating through 
the major institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World 
Trade Organisation, there has now for the first time since the fall of the 
Soviet Union emerged an actually existing alternative in what is 
sometimes called South-South cooperation. This is especially the case 
with Chinese aid and investment, in Asia, Africa and, to a growing 
extent, Latin America.6   
More specifically Welle-Strand (2010: 11) concludes that with respect to 
‘emerging donors’ (and China is the main donor in her article): ‘the emerging 
donors provide foreign aid on different terms, in different sectors, through different 
organisational structures, and with different goals than do the traditional donors’. 
She looks at ‘four main ways’ China challenges the current foreign aid paradigm:  
The donor-recipient relationship is challenged by a partnership of equals; 
The modes of provision are challenged by China’s focus on aid that is 
mutually beneficial; The use of conditionalities is challenged by China’s 
insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs; 
Multilateralism is challenged by China’s preference of going the major 
foreign aid projects alone (Welle-Strand 2010: 3).7 
                                                                                                                                                   
Diakonia). 
Woods, N. (2008) Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in 
development assistance. International Affairs, 84(6), 1205-1221. 
King, K. (2010a) New Actors – Old Paradigms? NORRAG News (44), 8-12. 
6 Sörensen, J. S. (2010) Challenging the aid paradigm: Western currents and Asian alternatives. 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan). 
7 Welle-Strand, A. (2010) Foreign aid strategies: China taking over? Asian Social Science, 6(10), 3-
13. 
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Increasing number of scholars have pointed to the distinctiveness of China. They 
find a growing realisation that, ‘poor nations might find appropriate, low-cost and 
sustainable solutions to their problems in other developing countries rather than in 
the rich north’ (Owen and Melville, 2005: 1).8 They notice that the role of China is 
different from the Western donors - ‘unique, has one foot in the developing world 
and another in the developed one, with a seat on the UN Security Council’, and this 
dual status gives it a considerable political and diplomatic advantage in the pursuit 
of its interest (Muekalia, 2004: 5).9 During the Beijing Summit, King (2006: 4) 
found, ‘what is absolutely clear today, four decades later, is how China’s discourse 
about common economic benefit, common political exchange, and common 
cultural cooperation appears to have been fully accepted by its African partners’, 
and he found two-way trade was ‘one of the key messages of the Beijing Summit’ 
(King, 2006:12).10 Zafar believes that the Chinese way of aid will influence both 
Africa and Western donors, and thus the West should creatively bring the Chinese 
model into the broader development platform (2007: 126).11 Brautigam (2011: 752) 
characterises Chinese aid as ‘non-transparent and poorly understood’. As she 
summarised, ‘China’s cooperation may be developmental, but it is not primarily 
based on official development aid. This suggests that the institutions established at 
                                                          
8 Owen, O. & Melville, C. (2005) China and Africa: A new era of 'South-South cooperation'. 
Available online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-africa_democracy/south_2658.jsp 
(accessed 1 February 2011). 
9 Muekalia, D. J. (2004) Africa and China's strategic partnership. African Security Review, 13(1), 5-
11. 
10 King, K. (2006) Aid within the wider China-Africa partnership: A view from the Beijing Summit. 
Available online at: http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/China-
Africa/papers/King,Kenneth.pdf (accessed 21 May 2010). 
Beijing Summit is the 3rd Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing, 2006.  
11 Zafar, A. (2007) The growing relationship between China and sub-saharan africa: Macroeconomic, 
trade, investment, and aid links. The World Bank Research Observer 22(1), 103-130. 
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the OECD to develop and apply standards for foreign aid (the DAC) may not be 
the right ones to govern these growing ties’.12 
Based on this growing recognition of China’s distinctive approach to foreign aid, 
this paper explores the ‘donor logic’ of China’s educational aid in Africa. Firstly, 
‘donor logic’ in this paper embraces the ways that donors justify their strategies and 
actions to both the recipients and their sponsors (if applicable, e.g. foundations, 
enterprises, governments, etc.). It also considers the donor ideologies, philosophies, 
motives and rationales, and how they legitimatise their actions. Basically, it is 
about what types of aid are provided, how and why. Therefore ‘donor logic’ refers 
to the aggregate of the donors’ presentation of ‘aid’. This presentation includes the 
donors’ rationale for providing aid visibly shown in practice and in discourse, and 
the actual underpinning logic that needs to be interpreted.    
The term ‘donor logic’ is not often directly mentioned in the research literature. It 
can be seen directly in Steiner-Khamsi’s (2008: 3) Donor logic in the era of Gates, 
Buffett, and Soros’, when she contrasted the drivers behind aid from the donor’s 
perspectives with recipients’ actual needs. In her study of Mongolia’s educational 
‘imports’, the support from the lender was driven more by what they had to offer 
than by what the borrower actually needed. She also looked at the logic of NGOs, 
and encouraged us to focus more on the ‘unruly’ and ‘very generous private 
funders’ rather than the ‘rule-abiding and rule-enforcing multilaterals’, in order to 
make some effort to change the aid environment (ibid: 6).13 The paper indicates 
                                                          
12 Brautigam, D. (2011) Aid ‘with Chinese characteristics’: Chinese foreign aid and development 
finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime, Journal of International Development, (23): 752-764. 
13 Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2008) Donor logic in the era of Gates, Buffett, and Soros. Current issue in 
comparative education, 10(1/2), 10-15. 
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how some lenders’ logic may be ‘illogical’ towards the recipients. There are very 
few other studies that have considered donor logic. Cammack (2007) has argued 
that certain political logics, under ‘much centralisation of power’ and ‘little 
accountability and transparency’ in some poor performing and fragile African 
countries, ‘undermine economic development and democratic consolidation’ (ibid: 
61), and these led the author to suggest that recipient governments should be driven 
by the needs and desires of their people rather than by donors.14 King (1992) earlier 
examined the external aid agenda and internal educational reform and called for a 
clearer definition of foreign aid policies. As he pointed out, ‘if therefore the new 
aid paradigm is more invasive of national policies and politics than ever before, it 
looks as if the logic of the new approach should lead to as much rethinking of the 
aid process in the donor countries as of reform in the recipients’ (ibid: 262).15 Here, 
he could be seen to be suggesting that a shift in aid may require a more profound 
reappraisal of the fundamental donor logic. These discussions directly or indirectly 
call for reflection on the gap between what donors think about and what recipients 
need. From this perspective China’s donor logic makes it easier to consider the 
voices of the recipients, since in comparison with the Western ‘catching up’ logic, 
it is based on a ‘win-win’ policy. Therefore this aid practice will not only shape the 
recipient side (one-way, which can easily cause a hierarchy) but also the donor side, 
as well as their relationships (two-way). Some existing literatures (e.g. King, 2006; 
David, 2007) have discussed China’s win-win strategies but have not reached a 
                                                          
14 Cammack, D. (2007) The logic of African neopatrimonialism: What role for donors? Development 
Policy Review, 25(5), 599-614. 
15 King, K. (1992) The external agenda of aid in internal educational reform. International Journal of 
Educational Development 12(4), 257-263. 
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comparison between this and the Western logic- to reveal this is actually the 
fundamental difference between China and the West.16 
Based on this reciprocal logic of aid, the key question which underlines the notion 
of ‘donor logic’ is: Is there any rationale about ‘how to make aid welcomed’? This 
is perhaps the main difference between Chinese and Western aid, as China is 
aiming to deliver a welcomed aid (developing a fraternal relationship) while the 
West is focusing more on an effective aid (harmonising a paternal relationship). In 
the practice, China gives ‘aid’ while seeking cooperation and exchange. The 
Chinese government uses the phrase ‘China-Africa cooperation’ more frequently 
than ‘Chinese aid to Africa’. In the educational field, China also prefers to use 
‘educational exchange’ rather than ‘educational aid’. The educational discourse and 
practice (which will be discussed in the next section) from China are shown with 
the focus on building two-way relationships rather than professionally suggesting 
development modalities. It is more than setting up a ‘China model’ but rather a 
process for lasting cooperation in the long run. The Chinese media likes to use a 
proverb to describe the logic of China’s educational assistance for Africa: ‘Give a 
man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him for 
a lifetime’ (Yuan, 2010: 60).17 It is therefore, like Brautigam’s (2011) discussion 
mentioned, difficult to calculate and evaluate Chinese aid according to the Western 
logic and modality framework as it is a developmental process for both of the 
                                                          
16 See King, ‘Aid within the wider China-Africa partnership: A view from the Beijing Summit’, and 
Davies, ‘China and the end of poverty in Africa – towards mutual benefit?’. 
17 Yuan, T. (2010) China’s aid logic to HRD in Tanzania: give a fish, teaching to fish, and sharing a 
fish. Norrag News, (44): 58-60.  
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donor and recipients rather than a ‘prescription’ operated by professional 
agencies/donors (Dale, 1982). 1819 
From the official discourse, the concept ‘win-win’ is shown as an economic 
strategy; from the description given by the Chinese government: ‘a new type of 
strategic partnership with Africa that features political equality and mutual trust, 
economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the PRC, 2006a).20 Therefore, the ‘win-win’ policy is centred upon a mutually 
beneficial economic process. However, since in recent times the word ‘win-win’ 
has increasingly been used in Chinese policy discourse, the meaning of win-win 
has been extended to different fields. According to Davies (2007: 34), apart from 
with economic cooperation, China and Africa could also share experiences on 
common challenges such as rural development, labour migration, urbanization and 
population growth, regional imbalances in development, the development of the 
domestic market, and integration with the international market. The two could also 
learn together to safeguard national interest in the face of the globalisation of 
                                                          
18 See Brautigam, “Aid ‘with Chinese characteristics’: Chinese foreign aid and development finance 
meet the OECD-DAC aid regime”.  
Dale, R. (1982) Education and the capitalist state: Contributions and contradictions, in: M. W. Apple 
(Ed.) Cultural and economic reproduction in education: Essays on class, ideology and the state. 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 127-161. 
19 China does not ‘do’ ‘professional aid’. In what has been described as its ‘technocratic frame’, 
Western aid is typically delivered through bureaucratised and professionalised consultants and 
specialist agencies and organisation (Kothari, 2005: 443) Quite differently, China has little delegation 
to, or participation/ involvement with local actors, and puts considerable emphasis on direct 
construction by Chinese engineers, or direct transferring and sharing of its own experience as a 
developing country. 
Kothari, U. (2005) Authority and expertise: The professionalisation of international development and 
the ordering of dissent. Antipode, 37(3), 425-446. 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2006a) China's Africa policy. Available online at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm (accessed 15 March 2013). 
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markets, and could together promote the interests of developing countries in world 
affairs.21 
Thus from a broader perspective, based on the official language and the academic 
analysis (as suggested in the definition of ‘donor logic’), this paper would like to 
define China’s ‘win-win’ logic of the foreign aid as: to ‘win’ a strengthened 
position in the global political economy while helping Africa to ‘win’ its 
development. This includes both of boosting China’s hard power- mainly economic 
development and boosting China’s soft power- for which one of the aims is to 
improve public understanding of China. The following sections will introduce how 
educational aid helps China to ‘win’ its soft power through strategy of public 
diplomacy. 
 
2. Logic of China’s educational aid: gaining soft power through ‘public 
diplomacy’ 
2.1 Increasing educational practice 
The above exploration indicates a different way of producing influence by China. 
More clearly, the logic is not about ‘how you catch up with me’ but about ‘how I 
can build a broader mutual beneficial (win-win) relation with you’. This 
relationship is not just about ‘trade’ but also about ‘communication’. Based on 
fieldwork undertaken in Tanzania, this paper is going to explore what sort of ‘win-
win’ relationship is demonstrated with China’s educational aid. Simply this paper 
                                                          
21 See David, ‘China and the end of poverty in Africa – towards mutual benefit?’. 
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considers what China wants to win internationally, especially in Africa, through 
educational support, exchanges and cooperation.   
It is noticeable that although in the last 50 years China has forged cooperative 
relations in the field of education with 50 African countries (Li, 2007), compared 
with the extensive discussions on China’s economic relations with Africa, Chinese 
educational aid has received very little attention.22 However, the Forum on China 
and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held every three years since 2000, has been 
making increasingly stronger promises in the field of education, particularly in its 
action plans at the 3rd Forum (Beijing Summit) in 2006 and the 4th Forum in 2009 
(FOCAC, 2006a; 2009).23 Education is clearly shown as an important component 
in China’s current African Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006a) 
as stated: ‘the Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its “African 
Human Resources Development Foundation” in training African personnel’ and 
the ‘exchange of students between China and Africa will continue’. 24 
While the FOCAC which dictated general cooperation between China and Africa, 
the education ministers from China and 17 African countries actually jointly signed 
a Beijing Declaration on 27 November 2005. ‘The Sino-African Education 
Minister's Forum is an important platform for exchange and cooperation between 
China and Africa on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and a significant 
                                                          
22 Li, B. (2007) On the issues concerned with China-Africa educational cooperation. Available online 
at: http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/China-Africa/papers/Li,Baoping-Eng.pdf (accessed 6 
June 2012). 
23 FOCAC (2006a) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009). Available 
online at: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm (accessed 2 March 2013). 
FOCAC (2009) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012). 
Available online at: http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm (accessed 2 March2013). 
24 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC ‘China’s African Policy’. 
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move for developing countries to seek educational development’, the declaration 
said (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2005).25  
A small number of discussions particularly on Chinese educational aid have 
occurred around the 2006 Beijing Summit, the 3rd FOCAC (PKUCAS, 2005; King, 
2006; 2007;Li, 2007).26 Brautigam (2009: 119) in the book ‘the Dragon’s gift’ 
shows evidence of the ‘accelerated training component of Chinese foreign aid’ that 
has been provided since 2000, ‘focusing in part on transferring information about 
China’s own experience with urbanisation, economic growth, and poverty 
alleviation’; and the doubling in the number of scholarships promised to African 
students at the Beijing Summit.27 According to King (2007: 343), although the 
2006 forum was ‘piggy-backed on the High Level Meeting on Education For All 
(EFA), it struck out on its own’, focusing more on the ‘prudent policies for 
vocational education and technical education, as well as to encourage higher 
education and cultural diversity’.28 
Despite China’s focus on higher education and training, what is also of interest in 
this paper is the underpinning logic of Chinese educational aid: although not 
directly shown in the official document, this ‘win-win’ based practice is assumed 
                                                          
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2005) Sino-African Education Minister Forum issues 
Beijing Declaration. Available online at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zt/zfjybzlt/t223750.htm 
(accessed 20 April 2009). 
26 PKUCAS (Centre for African Studies of Peking University) (2005) China Africa education 
cooperation (Beijing, Beijing University Press) (in Chinese). 
Also see King, “Aid within the wider China-Africa partnership: A view from the Beijing Summit”; 
and Li, “On the issues concerned with China-Africa educational cooperation”. 
27 Brautigam, D. (2009) The dragon's gift: The real story of China in Africa. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press). 
28 King, K. (2007) The Beijing China-Africa Summit of 2006: The new pledges of aid to education in 
Africa. China Report, 43(3), 337-347. 
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to be informed by the term ‘soft power’ (Nye, 1990; 2004).29 What does China 
seek to win from this educational investment? This paper will argue that 
educational aid helps China produce its soft power through the strategy of ‘public 
diplomacy’. The following discussion will take the Chinese Government 
Scholarships scheme as an example, which is also the main approach of Chinese 
educational aid, to show how educational support to Africa is operated in a 
diplomatic way and its actual perceptions on the ground. 
 
2.2 China’s engagement in soft power and public diplomacy 
Soft power is not a new term in international relations but a crucial task for the 
contemporary China. In the current world there are various instruments to increase 
soft power which could be understood much more readily than the ‘persuasion’ 
which was used through media and foreign policies before and during the time of 
the Cold War. Within these instruments public diplomacy is used by governments 
to mobilize resources (culture, political values and foreign policies) to 
communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than just their 
governments (Nye, 2008: 95).30 The modern meaning of public diplomacy was 
coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion who said that public diplomacy deals with the 
influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies 
(Cull, 2006). Nye combined ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘soft power’ and suggested 
that the current dimensions of public diplomacy include ‘daily communications’, 
                                                          
29 Nye, J. S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. (New York, Basic 
Books). 
Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York, Public Affairs). 
30 Nye, J.S. (2008) Public diplomacy and soft power, The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and social science, 616: 94-109. 
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‘strategic communication’ and ‘lasting relationships’ (Nye, 2008: 102). The last of 
these components will be addressed below.  
Gaining a good image of China in the world is a key task for the current PRC 
government. The Chinese government has started ‘issuing a steady flow of white 
papers’ clarifying its policies on issues such as ‘ethnic minorities, human rights and 
national defence’ after the State Council Information Office (SCIO) was 
established in 1991, and ‘educational and cultural exchanges were resumed’ 
(D’Hooghe, 2007: 22).31 In 2007, for the first time, the term ‘soft power’, ‘a 
Western term from 90s last century, was written into the report of the 17th 
Communist Party Congress’, which was extensively focused on the cultural 
dimension of the soft power (People.com.cn, 2007).32  
China’s practice in foreign aid, based on its ‘Chinese characteristics’ (Brautigam, 
2011) and its mutual beneficial logic, is becoming attractive to our existing 
understanding to the soft power. Kurlantzick's (2007) book Charm Offensive: How 
China's Soft Power is Transforming the World focuses on how China uses its soft 
power - culture, investment, academia, foreign aid, public diplomacy - to influence 
other countries in the developing world.33 According to Brautigam (2009: 15), like 
the US, China gives aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, 
and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and values. Therefore political leaders set 
                                                          
31 D’Hooghe, I. (2007) The rise of China’s public diplomacy. (Hague, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations). 
32 People.com.cn (2007) ‘Soft Power’ for the first time was written into the report of the 17th 
Communist Party Congress (in Chinese).  Available online at 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/6495273.html (accessed on 15 February 2012) 
33 Kurlantzick, J. (2007) Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. (New 
Haven, Yale University). 
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and shape aid as one of many instruments of foreign policy. 34 Chinese aid to Africa 
is seen as an important and challenging area for the government to develop its soft 
power (Wei, 2011).35 Increasing media reports are also showing China’s 
engagement in boosting its soft power in foreign aid especially its relation with 
Africa, and this will perhaps result not only a growth in soft power growth but also 
in hard power. 
The embrace of foreign aid as an instrument of ‘soft power’ and as a 
pillar of foreign policy has been notable in the United States – and it is 
increasingly so in India, Brazil and China as well. It is a reflection of 
how the landscape of global development and aid financing has changed 
in recent years (Jayawickrama, 2010).36 
Use of soft power diplomacy will continue to be a key driver of China’s 
strengthened relations with Africa and likely to propel China to higher 
global economic and military influence it currently commands (Musyoka, 
Mutai, & Ochieng, 2011).37  
In recent times China has realised the importance of using public diplomacy as an 
instrument to improve soft power. In 2009 President Hu Jintao for the first time 
declared the strengthening of ‘public diplomacy and the cultural diplomacy’ at 
                                                          
34 See Brautigam, ‘Dragon’s gift’. 
35 Wei, X. (2011) China’s aid to Africa and China’s soft power. Journal of University of International 
Relations, (1): 31-36. (in Chinese) 
36 Jayawickrama, S. (2010) Foreign Aid as “Soft Power” (in India, Brazil and China), Available online 
at: http://hausercenter.org/iha/2010/10/20/foreign-aid-as-soft-power-in-india-brazil-and-china/. 
Accessed on 31st March 2013. 
37 Musyoka, D., Mutai, P. & Ochieng, B. (2011) Soft power diplomacy to drive China-Africa relations 
in 2011, Xinhua News Net, available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
01/17/c_13694941.htm. Accessed 1st April 2013. 
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China’s 11th Diplomatic Envoys Meeting (Gmw.cn, 2011).38 In 2010 an academic 
journal called ‘Public Diplomacy Quarterly’ was established as the first Chinese 
journal for research on public diplomacy. Meanwhile a number of symposiums on 
public diplomacy were held in China (ibid). The official website of Chinese public 
diplomacy ‘www.pdcec.com’ was also established in May 2011, which aims to 
improve the national knowledge of public diplomacy and build a better image of 
the country (PDCEC, 2011).39 ‘China’s stunning economic growth in the last 30 
years has not resulted in positive public feelings abroad for the country as 
misunderstandings over many issues, such as territorial disputes, have generated 
negative sentiment’, wrote by Zhou and Mo (2012), ‘but the Chinese have in recent 
years experimented with discreet public diplomacy strategies to help point the way 
toward a more effective use of soft power a way to build up the country’s image’.40 
The China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) unveiled in Beijing on 31st 
December 2012 is a non-profit organization which is ‘dedicated to providing 
professional consultation and coordination services to advance the development of 
China's public diplomacy’. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi commented that, ‘Public 
diplomacy is a major direction for China to explore in the future, and tangible 
efforts will be made to boost public diplomacy and cultural exchanges’. The 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress, 
Li Zhaoxing, was elected president of the association. Li said that the association 
                                                          
38 Gmw.cn (2011) China’s public diplomacy: let the world understand a true China (in Chinese). 
Available online at: http://theory.gmw.cn/2011-07/26/content_2342419.htm (accessed 14 March 
2012) 
39 PDCEC (2011) About us. Available online at http://www.pdcec.com/list.php?fid=185 (accessed 10 
March 2012). 
40 Zhou, Q. & Mo, J. (2012) How 21st-century China sees public diplomacy as a path to soft power. 
Global Asia, a Journal of the East Asia Foundation, 7(3), available online at 
http://www.globalasia.org/V7N3_Fall_2012/Zhou_Qingan_and_Mo_Jinwei_.html?PHPSESSID=6cd
6671f43a69b7bea900ab6f2794bbe. Accessed 1st April 2013. 
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will be dedicated to ‘promoting China’s soft power’ by mobilizing and 
coordinating social resources and civilian efforts for Chinese public diplomacy 
(Zhang, 2013). 41 
Two features are especially apparent in this public diplomatic approach to the 
current Chinese soft power building: firstly there is a fast expanding and spreading 
of the knowledge and information of public diplomacy not only for the outside but 
also for the inside, where there is an effort to engage in and improve the domestic 
public recognition of public diplomacy. It is reported on the PDCEC website 
(2011), that ‘the image of the country will be built by our public’.42 To develop a 
people-to-people’s approach was also emphasised at FAOCA (2012a): 
Continue to strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and 
cooperation between the two sides. We will vigorously carry out 
dialogue between Chinese and African civilizations, and launch a new 
round of exchanges in culture, education, sports, tourism and other 
fields…43 
Secondly, as will be described below, cultural diplomacy and the use of human 
resources contribute significantly to China’s public diplomacy. Diverse types of 
educational cooperation are becoming increasingly important resources for public 
diplomacy. A landmark is the spreading of Chinese language teaching through the 
                                                          
41 Zhang, Y. (2013) China to boost public diplomacy, exchanges. Available online at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-01/01/content_16073517.htm. Accessed on 1st April, 
2013. (in Chinese) 
42 See PDCEC website ‘About us’. 
43 FOCAC (2012a) Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation. Online at: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954245.htm. 
Accessed 1st April 2013. 
This set a basis for the educational exchange: university students, as part of the social elite, will 
contribute to the soft power production of China. The following sections will continue to discuss this. 
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establishment of Confucius Institutes (CIs) which play an important role in 
building the image of China (Bao, 2011; Wu, 2012; Zhou and Mo, 2012).44 
Amongst the list of instruments key to China’s public diplomacy, D’Hooghe (2007) 
included CI and ‘student exchange’ as the first two instruments, followed by the 
‘media’, ‘publications’, ‘events’, ‘development aid and business deals’, which are 
very similar to the educational aid approaches discussed in this paper.45 Bao (2011: 
103) describes that the view university tutors towards teaching foreign students is 
changing, while foreign students are changing their attitudes towards China during 
their Chinese learning- “we often hear students saying that: ‘China is different from 
what I have imagined’”. Bao has pointed out that foreign students are ‘valuable 
resources’ for China’s public diplomacy (ibid).46   
These two features are the basis for the following exploration and understanding of 
the China-Africa cooperation in education and how education is not only offering 
educational resources but also diplomatic resources in this increasing closer 
relationship.  
 
2.3 Chinese Government Scholarship scheme 
As discussed above educational resources have already been recognised as a 
valuable part in raising soft power, and not only in China. Taking American 
                                                          
44 Bao, W. (2011) A Tentative Study on Public Diplomatic Awareness in International Education of 
Chinese Language. Journal of East China Normal University, (6): 100-104. (in Chinese) 
Wu, Y. (2012) Public Diplomatic Value of Confucian Institutes and Chinese Education for 
International Students. Journal of Xinjiang Normal University(Social Sciences), 33(4):100-105. (in 
Chinese) 
Also see Zhou and Mo, ‘How 21st-century China sees public diplomacy as a path to soft power’.  
45 See D’Hooghe, ‘The rise of China’s public diplomacy’. 
46 See Bao, ‘A Tentative Study on Public Diplomatic Awareness in International Education of Chinese 
Language’. 
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immigrant and education policies for foreign students as a typical example, Zhou 
(2012: 44) argued that the subjectivities involved into a diplomatic procedure are 
not only governmental officials but also publics, including both of the ordinary 
public and social elite. 47 Based on the above discussion and despite Chinese 
language which is increasingly being considered as having a key role in China’s 
public diplomacy, the following sections of this paper will consider how the higher 
educational cooperation (especially enrolling African students to Chinese 
universities) is bringing broader value to China’s public diplomacy. By offering 
study opportunities to African students especially, China’s logic is to win a good 
image, and more importantly, a lasting relationship with Africa.   
As previously mentioned China has a focus in higher education and vocational 
training in its educational aid to Africa. Generated from FOCAC pledges and 
fieldwork investigation (described in the next section), the main approaches of 
Chinese educational aid can be summarised in Table 1 (Yuan, 2011).48 Moreover in 
this table the educational approaches, considered as the different instruments of 
public diplomacy are linked with China’s public diplomacy. These approaches can 
actually be seen as the ‘instruments’ of public diplomacy and the production of the 
educational aid can actually be understood as the ‘resources’ of the public 
diplomacy. As long as these resources are ‘attractive’ to certain members of the 
African public (briefly listed in the middle column of the table), these instruments 
will help the Chinese government to improve its soft power.  
                                                          
47 Zhou, H. (2012) Public diplomacy and China/U.S.Soft-power Strategies. World Outlook, (1): 34-
47. 
48 Yuan, T. (2011) ‘Diploma’ Serves ‘Diplomacy’? Politics of Chinese Government Scholarships in 
Tanzania. Norrag News, (45): 126.  
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Table 1: Chinese educational aid as part of its public diplomacy 
Instruments 
(Aid approaches) 
Public 
(Recipients) 
Resources 
 
Government scholarship African students; 
African scholars 
Higher education in Chinese 
universities  
Short-term training49  African 
professionals and 
officials 
Chinese experience in 
development (e.g. schooling) 
Cultural exchanges  African schools; 
governments 
Chinese culture, performance 
and language 
Confucius Institute 
(Chinese language) 
Universities; 
individuals 
Chinese culture, language and 
values 
School construction and 
donation 
African schools Materials including books and 
posters 
Teacher secondment Colleges and 
university students 
and staff 
Experience and knowledge 
‘exported’ by person 
University cooperation University students 
and scholars/staff 
Chinese higher education and 
technology 
 
Within these ‘instruments’ the Chinese Government Scholarship scheme, related to 
the ‘student exchange’, was mentioned most frequently in official documents, is 
the instrument with the most evidence on the ground and examined as the main aid 
approach by China. According to the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC) (2011), a 
non-profit institution affiliated with the Ministry of Education, the Chinese 
Government Scholarship scheme has been ‘established by Chinese Ministry of 
Education (MoE) in accordance with educational exchange agreements or 
memorandum of understandings signed between Chinese government and 
governments of other countries, organizations, education institutions and relevant 
international organizations to provide both full scholarships and partial 
                                                          
49 Short-term training is held by government authorised Chinese universities, usually 2 weeks and 
takes the form of workshop. 
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scholarships to international students and scholars’.50 The scheme supports students 
who come to study in China on undergraduate and postgraduate programs, as well 
as Chinese language training programs, and general scholar and senior scholar 
programs (CSC, 2009; 2011).51 The applicants can apply for the scholarship 
through ‘dispatching authorities, institutions or the Chinese diplomatic missions’ 
(ibid, 2011). Moreover there are also other types Chinese scholarships such as the 
China-UNESCO Great Wall Fellowship Programme, China-AUN (ASEAN 
University Network) Scholarship Programme and China-EU Scholarship 
Programme, but the scholarship mentioned in this paper is the only one referred to 
in the ‘scholarship quota specified according to inter-governmental agreements’ 
(ibid, 2011). Thus one of the most important determinants of this scholarship is its 
‘governmental’ characteristics which are a political feature.  
The number of Chinese government scholarships has increased rapidly since the 
2006 Beijing Summit (the 3rd FOCAC). It was promised by Chinese government 
in 2006 FOCAC’s Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) that the number of Chinese 
government scholarships for African students would be increased from 2,000 to 
4,000 per year by 2009 (FOCAC, 2006a).52 This number increased again in the 
Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) of the 4th FOCAC in 2009, as described 
above, and proposed to be 5,500 by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009).53 Also in this plan 
China proposed to train a certain number of school headmasters and teachers over 
                                                          
50 CSC (2011) Notice to international students studying in China. Available online at: 
http://en.csc.edu.cn/Laihua/dd6ed814b3074388b197734f041a42bb.shtml (accessed 10 August 2011). 
51 CSC (2009) Chinese government scholarship scheme. Available online at:  
http://en.csc.edu.cn/Laihua/11678d1ad1114276a296ca1f3da38f99.shtml (accessed 10 August 2011). 
Also see CSC, ‘Notice to international students studying in China’.  
52 See FOCAC (2006a) ‘Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)’. 
53 See FOCAC (2009) ‘Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-
2012)’. 
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the next three years, and continues to promote the development of Confucius 
institutes, while also increasing the number of scholarships offered to Chinese 
language teachers to help them study in China (ibid). In 2012, at the 5th FOCAC, 
China promised again to continue providing training to African personnel and 
would provide 18,000 government scholarships over the next three years to Africa 
(Chinanews, 2012).54 
Chinese government does not provide details of the financial commitment or 
amounts it promised to African countries on each of these approaches. This 
unclarity may be for three reasons. Firstly, China’s aid does not come in the form 
of cash, or cost calculable projects (Brautigam, 2009: 124).55 From the fieldwork 
investigation the dominant educational aid modality is scholarships; however 
despite the numbers of scholarship there is no clear figure available on the cost of 
each scholarship. Figures published by the China Daily (2010) show that China 
increased the total finance of government scholarships to 6.5 billion RMB in 2010 
which includes the finance for African students. There are some monthly living 
cost for these students provided (in Chinese currency RMB as well) which could 
possibly help a rough calculation (ibid).56 The second reason is the more general 
one that Chinese aid delivery channels are fragmented across several government 
ministries or institutions. The main authority is the Ministry of Commerce, but 
various other governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
                                                          
54 Chinanews (2012) President Hu declared 5 new strategies of China-Africa cooperation. Available 
online at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/07-19/4044206.shtml. Accessed 1st March 2013. (in 
Chinese) 
55 See Brautigam, Dragon’s gift.  
56 The allocations are 1,400 RMB for undergraduate students monthly, 1,700 RMB for master 
students monthly, and 2,000 RMB for PhD students monthly (China Daily, 2010).   
China Daily (2010) Chinese government scholarships benefit more African students (in Chinese). 
Available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/zgrbjx/2010-02/01/content_9404154.htm (accessed 
2 March 2011). 
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Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the Chinese Embassies, and the State Council are involved in the 
decision making process (Pehnelt, 2007: 2; Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 
2009: 19).57 Thirdly, as well as the problem of fragmentation, analyzing the size 
and quality of China’s aid program is not a trivial task because of a fundamental 
lack of transparency (Pehnelt, 2007: 2).58  
This then lead to the question that, what exactly is the overall return on 
government’s investment in this scholarship scheme, and how? It seems China is 
not keen on showing an accurate statistics for its aid performance. According to 
Brautigam (2009: 125), a normal grant-in-kind with a value in Chinese currency 
and direct donations make for good pictures in the media, which helps build a nice 
image of China in Africa.59 As previously described, educational communication 
can provide ‘how to fish’ in order to gain more ‘fish’ for both sides in the future. 
So we may conclude that the outcomes include a transformation of development 
experience, a good image of China and lasting relationships. These are achieved 
through both of the university study and the broader communication by using 
higher education as rich and sustainable resource. This might be the reason of the 
‘vague’ statistics of the Chinese scholarships- as the ‘donor logic’ is aiming at a 
wider environment within higher education and outcomes (based on education but 
more than education) it can bring. Specifically, this public diplomacy procedure 
                                                          
57 Pehnelt, G. (2007) The political economy of China’s aid policy in Africa. Report for Friedrich-
Schiller-University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Germany). 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (2009) Financial commitments for infrustructure in Africa for 
2008. Available online at: 
http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/2010/2008_Financial_Commitments_Eng_PDF.pdf 
(accessed 12 July 2010). 
58 See Pehnelt, ‘The political economy of China’s aid policy in Africa’. 
59 See Brautigam, ‘the dragon’s gift’. 
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does not directly link government activities to the general public but certain ‘key 
individuals’. Nye (2008: 102) mentioned ‘the development of lasting relationships 
with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, 
seminars, conferences, and access to media channels’ provided earlier experience 
of USA in the practice of student scholarships (also noted in Zhou, 2012). 60 In 
China, aid and cooperation plans are always carried out by Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with Chinese Embassies and authorised 
Chinese universities. So we can summarise a ‘communication route’ of China’s 
public diplomacy in providing student scholarships as shown in Table 2. Here the 
university students and scholars, seen as social elite, would contribute to the 
delivery of transferred knowledge, experience, culture and value they gained from 
China to African public. These returning students are working within diverse 
sections in the African societies, and those who have returned to be teachers in 
African higher institutions particularly contribute to the following route (there are 
some interviewees in the following fieldwork section). 
Table 2 China’s scholarship public diplomacy communication route  
 
However, two points need to be noticed: firstly the dominant powers are the 
ministries of foreign affairs of both sides (will be discussed in the next section). 
                                                          
60 See Nye, ‘Public diplomacy and soft power’ and Zhou, ‘Public diplomacy and China/U.S.Soft-
power Strategies’.  
Chinese  
government
Chinese 
authorised 
universities
African university 
students/scholars 
(Social elite)
African public
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Secondly the last category- the public, is an expecting achievement of the public 
diplomacy. Critiques argue that, ‘although African elites and the Chinese 
government sing the song of friendship and mutually beneficial south-south 
cooperation, there is growing resentment at the grassroots level that has so far been 
ignored’ (Horta, 2009).61 Therefore the graph showed above is not yet fully 
achieved, and according to Chinese reflection upon Chinese aid in Africa, some 
failures in building a positive image in Africa is due to the lack of ‘soft power’, 
including lacking grassroots communication and exchanges (Chinanews, 2012).62 
The next section will look at what the feedback looks like on the ground. It is of 
particular interest to see how this is linked to some of the diplomatic features of the 
Government Scholarship. 
 
3. Actual experience on the ground: fieldwork in Tanzania 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted during field work in Tanzania and 
China over the period July to December in 2008. The key informants in Tanzania 
were chosen from the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Dar es 
Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT), Dar es Salaam University College of 
Education (DUCE) and the Chinese Embassy. Participants from these institutions 
                                                          
61 Horta, L. (2009) China in Africa: soft power, hard results-but Africa’s poor don’t see China as a 
great power, YaleGlobal, Available online at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china%E2%80%99s-
soft-power-africa-could-have-hard-results. Accessed 1st April 2013. 
62 Chinanews (2012) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report interpret criticism on Chinese aid in 
Africa: due to soft power lagged behind. Available online at http://www.oushinet.com/172-546-
183629.aspx accessed 1st April 2013 (in Chinese). 
This view is based on the recent publication ‘Yellow book of Africa: annual report on development in 
Africa No.14 (2011-2012)’, edited by Zhang, H., published by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
According to Chinanews (2012), during the launch of the report He Wenping, a leading scholar from 
the Academy pointed out that, the lagging behind of soft power caused some misunderstandings of 
China’s engagement in Africa. China needs effort in promoting more public communications, 
especially among grass roots.    
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could be considered as coming from two groups: official people whose duties were 
related to educational aid, and returning students who studied in Chinese 
universities with Chinese government scholarships. The university principals were 
also interviewed. They answered questions mainly including the introduction of the 
educational aid situation and the personal perception or experience of Chinese 
education. The names used in this paper are pseudonyms or codes (RTS refers to 
returning student). 
According to the interviewees at the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam, there are 
over 200 universities accepting African students through this Chinese Government 
Scholarship. These universities are in different cities across China, for instance, 
Shandong University, Zhongnan University, University of International Business 
and Economics, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan University of 
Technology. The subjects that students could study cover a large range and include 
agriculture, information industry, electronic communication, computer science, 
management, economic, environment, geology, animal, life science and so on. 
During the fieldwork at Dar es Slaam, Chinese government scholarships were 
mentioned by Chinese and Tanzanian officials and the returning students, as an 
important vehicle of educational cooperation between China and Tanzania. Both of 
these groups talked about the student scholarships and provided similar views. It 
seems that officials from both sides have made a clear agreement about educational 
cooperation. The main features of the process of distributing scholarships can be 
seen from the interview data described as follows. 
A diplomacy based procedure 
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Firstly, the concern of the scholarship is focused on bilateral relations. In terms of 
the procedure, scholarships are firstly considered as a diplomatic affair and then as 
an educational affair. In Tanzania, the offer is officially delivered to the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and then forwarded to 
their Ministry of Education, and finally the information is distributed nationwide. 
As the secretary Han at the Chinese embassy described:  
The two countries’ issues always go through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but are carried out by the Ministry of Education. The details of 
the scholarships, including their number and the different majors, will be 
advertised in the local newspaper, and in a Swahili and English 
newspaper. Both of these newspapers have the most circulation in 
Tanzania. The English paper is the Daily News, and the other is a 
Swahili newspaper. The universities are also informed of the scholarship 
information, and they can then organise and recommend some excellent 
students to apply for the scholarship. So there are individual applications, 
and applications organised by universities. For example, the University 
of Dar es Salaam selects and recommends students to us every year. 
Kim, from the Tanzanian Ministry of Education, also explained her job during the 
process of scholarship selection: 
My job is associated with the communication of the scholarship. The 
Embassy of China sends a letter to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
they hand it to the Ministry of Education, after that the information will 
be published publically. Sometimes we fast track it through coordination 
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with the office at the Embassy of China. There is a committee for 
selection called the sub-advisory committee for higher education and 
training. The chairmanship is in this ministry, but we have members from 
Zanzibar and other ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Zanzibar coordinating office, the civil service department and director of 
higher education (of Zanzibar). This committee will sit down and discuss 
the scholarships. 
Both the descriptions provided by Han and Kim illustrate the ‘inter-governmental’ 
characteristics of the scholarship. It is government centred rather than university 
centred. Therefore, political motives are always embedded into the educational 
action. It is even more political when considering how to make the selection of the 
qualified students nationwide. Kim described that after advising scholarship 
information nationally especially in the universities, the ‘sub-advisory committee’ 
evaluates and selects the best candidates for the scholarships. However there was 
still a lack of a detailed description of the scholarship distribution, either from 
Chinese or Tanzanian official sources. This might indicate that the increasing 
number of scholarships might be related to greater access but this does not directly 
mean more equal access in higher education. The reason is again fundamentally 
based on China’s logic: the scholarship scheme is not implemented for spreading a 
sort of educational mechanism, but rather for transferring development experience, 
forming a cultural impact and building relationships.  
Previously mentioned Nye’s discussion on ‘key individuals’ inspires the 
explanation for the lack of clarity with respect to the distribution of the 
scholarships. These are politically based and are selective, and are aimed at social 
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elite - not all the public but a group of selected students who may contribute a lot, 
either academically or politically, to the ‘win-win’ outcomes of the China-Africa 
relationships.   
Three diplomacy based clues  
Under Tanzanian context some specific diplomacy based factors could be found 
from the text and on the ground. There are three clues in the following discussion: 
the cultural framework, the discourse of ‘two-sides’ and the mechanism of 
flexibilities.  
The first is the cultural framework for the educational practice. It is confirmed 
from both of my interviewees and the official website that there are two parts of the 
scholarship, the bilateral scholarship (the main part of the Government Scholarship 
scheme) and the unilateral scholarship. The first one is set within the Cultural 
Agreement signed by the two countries, and the latter is added ‘as a follow-up of 
the Beijing Summit (2006) of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’ (Embassy 
of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 2009).63 
The previous Cultural Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Tanganyika and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed in 
1962. The current agreement is an upgraded Cultural Agreement signed in 1992 
between the PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania, describes the essential 
policy basis for the government scholarship scheme (Embassy of the PRC in the 
                                                          
63 Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania (2009) Chinese government scholarship. 
Available online at: http://tz.China-embassy.org/eng/ztgx/t577997.htm (accessed 2 January 2010). 
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United Republic of Tanzania, 2008).64 The agreement declares, that the two 
Contracting Parties (PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania) agree, ‘in 
accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit, to promote 
exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in the fields of culture, 
education, science, health, sports, publication, the press and broadcasting’. Under 
the agreement, China promises 100 scholarships to Tanzania every year, however 
as described by the secretary at the Chinese embassy, ‘it does not mean we will 
offer 100 scholarships every year. It means if we offer 100, then the next year there 
60 that have graduated from Chinese universities, we will add 60 more to the 
Chinese universities. So we maintain 100 students studying in China every year’.65 
It can be seen that it is not about getting more students into China, but rather 
maintaining a certain number of students in China every year, in order to maintain 
a stable level of educational practice as a part of Cultural Agreement between the 
two countries. It can be seen from this cultural framework that, educational aid is 
not a separated practice but embedded into a number of practices including cultural, 
scientific and media work. As King (2010b: 86) pointed out, ‘ultimately all the 
many elements of China’s cooperation with Africa are inseparable from the 
political, economic and trade engagements with Africa’.66 This blended model of 
aid, investment, trade, and technology acts as levers for development, while less 
common in Western approaches, this embeds education into wider bilateral 
relationships.   
                                                          
64 Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania (2008) Cultural relation between China 
and Tanzania. Available online at: http://tz.China-embassy.org/eng/ztgx/whjy/t422282.htm (accessed 
13 June 2009). 
65 Ibid.  
66 King, K. (2010b) China’s cooperation with Africa, and especially South Africa, in education and 
training. A special relationship and a different approach to aid? Journal of International Cooperation 
in Education, 13(2), 73-87. 
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The second clue is the discourse of ‘two-sides’ and ‘exchange’, which include both 
the discourse from official documents and the discourse from the interviews. 
According to the Cultural Agreement: 
Between 2005 and 2007, the Chinese side offered one hundred 
government full scholarships to Tanzania each year. The Tanzanian side 
offered China five government scholarships in 2006 and four government 
scholarships in 2007 (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2008).67 
Although the numbers from each side are not equal, the Chinese document 
suggests an equal atmosphere between the two sides, which is actually consistent to 
previously mentioned China’s preference of using ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘aid’. 
The text suggests that it as an example of a two-way ‘exchange’ rather than one-
way ‘aid’. It potentially shows that the Tanzanian side would not just be helped but 
will also contribute. The two-way contribution discourse was also strengthened in 
the latest FOCAC action plan (FOCAC, 2012b): the articles on educational action 
plan are started from the perspective of ‘the two sides…’, for example:  
The two sides noted with satisfaction that cooperation of higher quality 
and in more diverse forms on education was conducted between China 
and Africa since the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference. The two 
                                                          
67 See Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, ‘Cultural relation between China and 
Tanzania’. 
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sides agreed to attach more importance to cooperation in education and 
push for new progress in China-Africa education cooperation...68 
Compared with the fourth FOCAC action plan which devoted more space to 
articles under what ‘the Chinese Government offered’ (FOCAC, 2009), the 2012 
plan showed this slight change on text, and even weakened the specific description 
of China would offer.69   
The third clue is the mechanism of flexibilities. At the beginning of this discussion 
on the diplomatic details another part of the scholarship-the unilateral one was 
mentioned. This means that besides the 100 student scholarships offered under the 
Culture Agreement, there are further opportunities for Tanzanian students, as Han 
introduced: 
The other part of the scholarship was decided after the Beijing Summit. It 
is called the Chinese one-side scholarship. This scholarship is more 
flexible in number, and is only one way. There are 30 one-side 
scholarships this year, and this is provided unconditionally by the 
Chinese government. The benefits offered by the scholarship are the 
same as the scholarship under the Culture Agreement, and also include 
undergraduate, master and doctoral levels. These have been issued 
because of the enlarged aid to Africa since the Beijing Summit. 
The unilateral scholarship was described by Han as chances for students who 
cannot get access to information on bilateral scholarships easily: 
                                                          
68 FOCAC (2012b) The fifth ministerial conference of the forum on China-Africa cooperation Beijing 
Action Plan (2013-2015). Online at: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/t954620.htm. Accessed 
1st April 2013. 
69 See FOCAC, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012).  
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For example, the scholarship information is easily to spread in Tanzania 
but not in Zanzibar. So when the Ministry of Education cannot send the 
information to Zanzibar on time, we will help to by providing some 
additional scholarships to Zanzibar directly by implementing the one-side 
scholarship.  
However this also revealed that the unilateral scholarship could be implemented 
using a much more flexible procedure than the bilateral ones. This can be offered 
to students in rural and marginal areas, but can also be offered as a benefit for 
people close to the Chinese government. One of the examples was described by the 
Chinese official, Li:  
This year there was a student who was the daughter of a member of the 
Tanzanian Olympic Games committee. She was also an excellent student, 
and just finished her study in USA. But she didn’t get the bilateral 
scholarship so we checked her study performance, interviewed her and 
awarded her the unilateral scholarship. 
This case may suggest more specific factors in the aforementioned ‘social 
elite’ procedure of public diplomacy: people with political/diplomatic tiles 
will more easily get included as candidates for the unilateral scholarship.  
Institutional cooperation 
Thirdly, there are not only selected individuals but also institutions that receive 
offers from the Chinese government. There is inter-institutional cooperation 
between China and Africa. The 2009 FOCAC promised 20 one-to-one cooperative 
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pairs between Chinese and African universities during the followed three years 
(FOCAC, 2009).70 This 20+20 Plan was extended in the 2012 FOCAC action plan 
(FOCAC, 2012b).71 Moreover, the 2012 plan added that the cooperation would 
‘encourage Chinese and African universities to carry out cooperation in regional 
and country studies and support African universities in establishing China research 
centres’ (ibid).  
During the fieldwork, Kim described that Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology 
(DIT) regularly received scholarships from the Chinese embassy. According to the 
interview with the principals and staff at DIT, the cooperation between the institute 
and the Chinese embassy started in the 1990s. Under the agreement between the 
PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania in 1991, a collaborative project between 
Xian Highway University (Xi’an Jiao Tong University, China) and Dar es Salaam 
Technical College (DTC, currently DIT) was set up to develop a Highway and 
Transportation Engineering Laboratory. In 1993, the laboratory was established 
through ‘generous assistance’ from China. The main objective of this project was 
to strengthen the DIT’s highway section by providing equipment, experts and the 
training of staff in the field of Highway and Transportation Engineering. Four 
experts from China were dispatched to DIT to assist their counterparts in 
technology transfer.72 
Also under the 1991 agreement, there were opportunities for human resource 
development through which some personnel from the former DTC were trained in 
                                                          
70 See FOCAC, ‘Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)’. 
71 See FOCAC, ‘The fifth ministerial conference of the forum on China-Africa cooperation Beijing 
Action Plan (2013-2015)’. 
72 The information about DIT is taken from a document provided by the principal of DIT during the 
fieldwork interview.  
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various fields in China. Most of them were trained at Xi’an Highway University. It 
is noteworthy that they obtained a high degree in China- mainly PhDs. They went 
back to DIT after graduation and now teach and research at DIT.  
Besides the cooperation in the field of highway engineering, the Chinese 
government began to target the computer science department at DIT. In June 2000, 
China entered an agreement to develop a Computer Laboratory at DIT. Under the 
agreement, the Chinese government provided the necessary teaching facilities to 
set up a laboratory with fifty micro-computers, provided experts to teaching in 
computer applications, and offered opportunities to train in China. The project 
lasted for two years, from December 2001.  
Following the successes in implementing this project, it was extended for another 
two years following the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 11th 
December 2003. During 2004-2005, China offered DIT 12 short and long term 
scholarships. During the fieldwork period, there were 3 DIT staff having obtained 
their master degrees in computer related subjects in China. Also, DIT has received 
three Chinese experts, supporting teaching and research. 
It can be seen that, in Tanzania, DIT has the privilege of having a certain number 
of Chinese Government Scholarships. In a straightforward procedure, a good 
number of DIT staff gained postgraduate degrees in China (even in the same 
universities) only in a few years time and then transfer their knowledge back to 
Tanzania. This one-to-one cooperative model is different from the Western trend 
on educational aid-offering General Budget Support (GBS) to the educational 
sectors or the recipient government (instead of funding ‘stand-alone’ projects) in 
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order to encourage more ownership of the recipient countries (Ohno and Niiya, 
2004: 7).73 China is not applied to this situation as it does not have ‘ownership’ 
issues which may partly based on Western colonial history within a hierarchical aid 
relationship. This actually has set up an equal basis for China to develop its 
relations with either individual institutes or directly with governments, and in an 
effective way. However DIT was the only institute suggested by study respondents 
at Tanzanian Ministry of Education when discussing institutional resources. 
Therefore it is not clear either in the texts or from the interviewees how many 
institutions such as DIT get such stable support from the Chinese government and 
contribute as a key role to boost the IT learning in the local area.  
Performance of the scholarship: image vs. quality 
The fieldwork in this study demonstrated that on the governmental level the 
perceptions of these educational practices were positive, and officials from both 
sides expressed similar opinions. However from a perspective of public diplomacy, 
it should be considered whether these educational resources were attractive enough 
for the Tanzanian public? This is linked directly to the performance of Chinese 
higher education rather than the performance of Chinese government. In the focus 
group discussion held at DIT with five staff and through one-to-one interviews 
with Tanzanian individuals (all of them have obtained degrees in China, thus seen 
as returning students in this study), the informants generally expressed a positive 
attitude towards to China and Chinese scholarships. Firstly there is the 
                                                          
73 According to Ohno and Niiya (2004: 7), under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes 
(PRSPs) agenda since the late 1990s, there has been a shift from structural adjustment operations to 
General Budget Support (GBS). According to the IMF (2005) PRSPs were ‘country-driven’ and thus 
would promote strong national ownership of development strategies including broad and active 
involvement of civil society (cited in Robertson et al., 2007: 60). 
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development knowledge they can learn from China as a developing country (which 
is seen as an old friend and a good example for their home country), and secondly 
since the bilateral relationship is getting closer, practically it is also good for their 
future careers. However in terms of the detailed aspects of their university study, 
the interviewees also expressed some worries about the quality of Chinese higher 
education. In fact, for the individual recipients, they did not seem to care about the 
politics of aid. What they did care about was their real lives in China, about 
whether they could get enough funding, whether they could identify good 
opportunities for themselves, and whether they can get a good job after their 
overseas study.  
When talked about the advantages and disadvantages of study in China, they 
expressed happiness about their opportunities to go to China, and described that 
they would be willing to go again for a higher degree such as a PhD, or else would 
consider sending their children in the future. When asked about whether their 
degree in China was important, they all gave positive answers and said ‘Yes, 
definitely’. They could see the value of a Chinese diploma, and even a broader 
relation between China and Tanzania.  
RTS G1: We learnt a lot in China and from China. Now it is very 
important that we use what we have learnt to teach and research…Yes 
we always ask, why can China be so successful in this era? So it is 
important to study in China. Tanzania is learning from China how to 
develop the country, and the Chinese are hardworking people. 
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RTS A: Many Chinese companies are now in this country. Most of them 
are engineering companies. The parliament building was built by a 
Chinese company. So maybe for us it is a good opportunity to study there 
as our government opens a lot of business and receives things such as 
this scholarship agreement from China. Now we have relations in many 
fields. 
On the other side, when describing factors that they were not satisfied about, they 
all mentioned the length of the degrees in China- three years for a Master, the 
funding amount, the teaching quality and the communication. The language seems 
to bring a series of problems for them. Compared with western education, Chinese 
lecturers were not very good at speaking English, and the communication with 
other Chinese students at the universities was also a problem. One of the results of 
this was that the Tanzanian students wanted to learn more, but the university 
sometimes treated them as foreigners and required less from them.  
RTS G2: According to my experience, the language caused some 
problems. When the teachers are going to teach the foreign students, they 
are slightly shy and not very confident. Nevertheless they know how to 
teach…however their evaluation is also different. Because you are a 
foreigner, they will just say, ok. But when you are Chinese, the teacher 
will be stricter.  
RTS A: They think you are a foreigner so you do not need to know this. 
So we cannot get receive knowledge at the same level as the Chinese 
students.  
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This reveals some specific issues for the communication takes place in the campus. 
There is also a gap between what governments focus on achieving and what the 
individuals actually receive from educational aid. While China is making an effort 
to increase the number of scholarships, and Chinese universities are trying to 
become globalised, actually the capacity for higher education may not be sufficient 
enough for the international students. If China aims to improve its soft power 
through education in the long run, it might need to improve its international 
competitiveness with respect to higher education, and make more effort to balance 
the ‘image’ of its scholarships with the ‘quality’ of its scholarships.  
4. Conclusion 
Now from a ‘diplomatic’ perspective the logic and features of Chinese educational 
aid may be more easily to be understood. It is firstly based on China’s construction 
of fraternal relationships in the foreign aid. Most of the existing literatures are 
concerning the specific motives of Chinese aid but increasingly find that Chinese 
aid is not professional, lack of transparency and cannot be easily categorised into a 
Western model (King, 2010b).74 The first section of this paper argued that this is 
because of a fundamental difference in donor’s logic: the Western ‘catching-up’ 
logic and Chinese ‘win-win’ logic. Different from Western aims of helping poor 
countries to reduce poverty and achieve modernisation with accurate targets and 
financial modalities, what China wishes, is not to ‘provide’ a ‘prescription’ (Dale, 
                                                          
74 King, K. (2010b) China’s cooperation with Africa, and especially South Africa, in education and 
training. A special relationship and a different approach to aid? Journal of International Cooperation 
in Education, 13(2), 73-87. 
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1982) and evaluate it, but to ‘win’ a mutual beneficial relationship in the global 
political economy and a good image of the current China, and then maintain it.75 
There has not been much discussion on China’s educational aid compared with the 
amount of discussion on China’s trade ties with Africa. This paper therefore has 
explored this in the second and third section. It is found that Chinese educational 
aid, featured similar to Chinese general aid and closely embedded into the China-
Africa bilateral relations. It is involved within a system of producing education as 
part of public diplomacy in a country’s global strategy rather than a system of 
producing education as a global target. As this is less on intervention but more on 
gaining relation, on the ground the Chinese aid is welcomed by the recipient 
countries. The returning students, as ‘key individuals’, showed their interests and 
motives of gaining a Chinese diploma, and also revealed specific issues, such as 
communication language, based on their university lives in China.  
The Chinese model of educational aid may provide some new evidence and 
complexities to the concept of ‘soft power’ which was basically built upon the 
American experience by Nye. As Dale (2011) addressed, ‘to understand the 
deployment of soft power, we need to place it in the wider structural context of a 
global political economy, where access to both material and cognitive means of 
production are increasingly crucial’.76 Although higher education is not a new 
resource for producing soft power, the Chinese educational aid especially its 
government scholarship, building upon its distinctive ‘win-win’ donor logic and 
                                                          
75 See Dale, ‘Education and the capitalist state: Contributions and contradictions’. 
76 This is from prof. Roger Dale’s paper presented on the International Conference on the Reemerging 
China and Its Impact on Asia and the United States, held at Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong 
Kong, 12-13 Januray 2012. 
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aid features, may not add new understandings to international education, but would 
definitely add alternative ideas of maintaining bilateral relationships for long term. 
Particularly, compared with the orthodox donor-recipient hierarchy, it is 
challenging the West even the world. It is such a fragmented but fast growing 
model under huge amount of attention.  
On the other hand, how grassroots in Africa can gain equal access to the 
scholarship is a remained question. It is crucial to ask, within this ‘win-win’ 
situation declared by China, as well as their educational cooperation (FOCAC, 
2006b), can majority of African publics get attracted by Chinese public 
diplomacy?77 And can African countries win both diplomatic and educational 
reciprocities within this mutual beneficial framework? These are the long term 
lessons for China if the country wishes to keep its international public reputation 
sustainably.    
                                                          
77 FOCAC (2006b) Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 
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